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ANOTHER BITE AT THE APPLE OR THE SAME BITE?
CHARACTERIZING HABEAS PETITIONS ON APPEAL AS
PENDING INSTEAD OF FULLY ADJUDICATED
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INTRODUCTION
Habeas corpus,1 the “Great Writ of Liberty,”2 has undergone
considerable change over the course of history. From its initial introduction in English common law,3 to its inclusion in the American
Constitution,4 to its fluctuating interpretation throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries,5 habeas corpus has remained
a fundamental part of the American legal system. With its passage
in 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) became the primary federal statutory authority for the
writ, and much case law has emerged at the district court, circuit
court, and even Supreme Court levels interpreting the various
changes the Act brought about.6 One of the Act’s most significant
aspects is its restriction on the filing of successive habeas corpus
petitions.7 Responding to this restriction, prisoners have attempted
to circumvent the AEDPA through a number of different procedural
routes with varying degrees of success.8
1. In Latin meaning “that you have the body,” habeas corpus is defined as “[a] writ
employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the person’s
imprisonment or detention is not illegal.” Habeus Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019).
2. ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 1
(2001); see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1963) (“We do well to bear in mind the
extraordinary prestige of the Great Writ, habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, in Anglo-American
jurisprudence: ‘the most celebrated writ in the English law.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129)).
3. See DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA: DUALISM OF POWER
AND LIBERTY 3-4, 7-9 (1966); Justin J. Wert, With a Little Help from a Friend: Habeas Corpus
and the Magna Carta After Runnymede, 43 POL. SCI. & POL. 475, 475-76 (2010).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
5. See JUSTIN J. WERT, HABEAS CORPUS IN AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
1-2 (2011).
6. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33391, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: A BRIEF
LEGAL OVERVIEW 8 (2010).
7. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214, 1217-21 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see
also DOYLE, supra note 6, at 11-12.
8. See, e.g., Stefan Ellis, Comment, Gonzalez v. Crosby and the Use of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) in Habeas Proceedings, 13 J. CONST. L. 207, 208-09 (2010) (discussing
the use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) motions in habeas proceedings); Justin
F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
85, 89-91 (2012) (arguing that federal habeas petitions should focus on the criminal
adjudication process as opposed to the resulting conviction); Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct.
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This Note examines the circuit split that has emerged for one of
those procedural attempts—motions to amend habeas petitions
following adjudication on the merits and while on appeal in a circuit
court.9 This Note argues that allowing amendment of habeas petitions on appeal is both consistent with the history of habeas corpus
in the United States and allowable under even the restrictive approach of the AEDPA. Finally, this Note advocates for Supreme
Court intervention on this issue despite the Court’s reluctance up
to this point.
Part I of this Note provides a background on the right of habeas
corpus in American history and discusses the changes and developments accompanying the AEDPA since its passage in 1996. Part II
discusses the Supreme Court’s rulings in Gonzalez v. Crosby and
Banister v. Davis, with particular focus placed on the Court’s analysis of Rule 60(b) and 59(e) motions. Part III uses cases in the
Second, Third, and Ninth Circuit Courts to illustrate federal courts’
various approaches to appeals after trial courts have adjudicated
the merits of initial habeas petitions. Part IV puts forth various
arguments as to why these motions should be allowed and why the
Supreme Court should intervene on this issue. It also proposes a
test that the Supreme Court should utilize when coming to a
decision, which utilizes the approaches currently used by the circuit
courts as well as related approaches to other procedural obstacles
of the AEDPA.
I. HABEAS CORPUS AND THE AEDPA
This Part briefly traces the development of the writ of habeas
corpus in the American legal system. Section A explains the writ’s
origins in common law and its evolution through early American
history. Section B covers the development and expansion of habeas
corpus in the United States following World War II, as well as its
contraction in the latter half of the twentieth century. Finally,

1698, 1702 (2020) (holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 59(e) motions to alter
or amend a habeas court’s judgment do not qualify as successive petitions).
9. See Andrew Hamm, A Habeas Circuit Split and Ohio’s Public-Sector Unions,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 12, 2021, 6:25 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/03/a-habeas-circuitsplit-and-ohios-public-sector-unions/ [https://perma.cc/8R7Q-KKFP].
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Section C explores the AEDPA and the significant changes brought
about by its passing, focusing on several of the key changes it codified in federal law.
A. Origins of Habeas Corpus and Its Development in the United
States
Habeas corpus, Latin for “that you have the body,”10 emerged
around the thirteenth century in England but was not officially
codified as a writ until the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.11 The writ of
habeas corpus in English common law took two forms: habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum and habeas corpus ad prosequendum.12
Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, known as the “Great Writ,” required that custodians of prisoners produce those prisoners in front
of the court and establish a lawful basis for their continued
imprisonment.13 The other writ, habeas corpus ad prosequendum,
could compel someone to appear in court to serve as a witness or for
other procedural purposes.14
William Blackstone described the writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum as “the most celebrated writ in the English law.”15
Both Blackstone’s Commentaries and Edward Coke’s Institutes had
profound influences on the thinking and practices of the American
colonists,16 and the Great Writ was enshrined to various degrees in
the statutes and rules of the American colonies.17 After gaining
independence, the United States solidified habeas corpus in what
came to be called the Suspension Clause of the Constitution.18
Habeas relief was soon after extended to federal prisoners under the
10. Habeas Corpus, supra note 1.
11. See Wert, supra note 3, at 475-76; Habeas Corpus, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/habeas-corpus [https://perma.cc/VZZ9-LV8X].
12. WILLIAM H. ERICKSON & B.J. GEORGE, JR., 2 UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
AND COMMENTS ¶ 5B.02 (2022).
13. Id.; see also Habeas Corpus, supra note 1.
14. ERICKSON & GEORGE, JR., supra note 12; see also Habeas Corpus, supra note 1.
15. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129.
16. See MEADOR, supra note 3, at 21-30.
17. See id. at 30-32; NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 6 (2011).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
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First Judiciary Act of 1789.19 The next major expansion of the writ
of habeas corpus occurred following the Civil War, when Congress
passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.20 This act granted federal
courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus “in all cases where
any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
constitution, or any treaty or law of the United States.”21 This
language was understood to extend the benefits of the writ of
habeas corpus to prisoners in state custody.22 Despite this statutory
extension, the Supreme Court typically rejected fundamental constitutional challenges through habeas, choosing to focus on only the
most outrageous violations of due process over the course of the
eighty years following the Act’s passage.23 The governing statutory
language, as well as the Court’s actions, remained relatively
consistent until the period immediately following World War II.24
B. Post-World War II Habeas Corpus Developments
In 1948, Congress added major habeas corpus revisions to federal
law, which notably included the splitting of habeas petition processes for state and federal prisoners.25 28 U.S.C. § 2255 allowed
federal prisoners to seek habeas relief and provided a more streamlined process for review.26 28 U.S.C. § 2254 focused on rules pertaining to prisoners in state custody,27 updating the provision of
review set forth in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.28 Even though
state and federal prisoners’ procedures for habeas corpus were
separated as a result of the provisions, the Supreme Court has

19. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
20. KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 17, at 50-52.
21. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 305, 385-86.
22. See MEADOR, supra note 3, at 56-57 (“Thus, for the first time, the federal writ was
extended generally to all persons held by state authority in violation of federal law. No longer
would the federal writ be confined to reviewing detention in the federal sphere.”); see also
KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 17, at 50-52 (discussing the extent and limits of the Act).
23. See WERT, supra note 5, at 117-18, 120-23.
24. See KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 17, at 9-10.
25. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-2255.
26. Id. § 2255; see also KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 17, at 54.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
28. See KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 17, at 54.
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typically applied similar rulings to both sections.29 Section 2241, an
additional update of the Act, served mainly as a general codification
of American judge-made law up to that point and provided access to
habeas for anyone not challenging a criminal judgment.30
Following these codifications, the Supreme Court expanded the
writ of habeas corpus through a series of cases in the mid- to latetwentieth century.31 In Brown v. Allen, the Supreme Court held
that for federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners, the federal
court should treat a state court’s decision on the merits as persuasive—but not binding—authority.32 The case also served to
solidify federal courts’ authority over habeas petitions filed by state
prisoners that alleged federal constitutional violations.33
Five years later, the Court further expanded the writ of habeas
corpus in the “1963 trilogy” of cases.34 This trilogy consisted of
Townsend v. Sain,35 Sanders v. United States,36 and Fay v. Noia.37
In Townsend, the Court articulated the instances in which a federal
habeas court must grant a hearing:
If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the
state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly
supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a
full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of
newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not
adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any
29. See id. at 57 (“Sanders was actually a Section 2255 case involving a federal prisoner,
although as in many such situations the Court applied the same rule to Section 2254 habeas
corpus cases.” (citing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963))).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; see also KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 17, at 10.
31. See WERT, supra note 5, at 141-42; MEADOR, supra note 3, at 65-70; KING & HOFFMAN,
supra note 17, at 54-60.
32. 344 U.S. 443, 458-60 (1953).
33. DOYLE, supra note 6, at 6 (“After Brown v. Allen, there was little doubt that the
federal habeas corpus statute afforded relief to state prisoners whose convictions were tainted
by constitutional violations, both those violations that would void state court jurisdiction and
those that would not.” (footnote and internal citation omitted)).
34. See WERT, supra note 5, at 151; see also Robert Baynes, Richard Dailey & DeWitt
McCotter, Note, Criminal Law—Habeas Corpus—the 1963 Trilogy, 42 N.C. L. REV. 352, 35253 (1964).
35. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
36. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
37. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the
habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.38

In Sanders v. United States, the Supreme Court asserted that there
was no limit to the number of successive federal habeas petitions
that could be made by a prisoner, provided that a different ground
was provided in each subsequent petition.39 Fay v. Noia, seen as the
most important of the “trilogy,”40 turned on the issue of state procedural defaults in the context of habeas petitions, as the petitioner
had allowed the time for appeal to elapse in state court but sought
federal review of his conviction.41 The Court held that federal court
jurisdiction would not be overridden by a state court’s refusal to
review a federal claim due to a state procedural deficiency on the
part of the defendant.42 Townsend, Sanders, and Noia resulted in a
push for states to reform their own judicial processes and for state
court judges to enforce the expanded habeas rights articulated by
the Court.43
Following these momentous changes and reforms, subsequent
decisions by the Supreme Court restricted inmates’ ability to bring
habeas petitions to the federal courts.44 In 1976, the Court in Stone
v. Powell held that a state prisoner is unable to obtain relief for a
federal habeas claim alleging an unconstitutional search or seizure
under the Fourth Amendment when the state already provided a
full and fair litigation.45 A year after that decision, the Court
narrowed the standard set forth in Fay v. Noia for state prisoners
who failed to bring a federal claim during trial.46 Then, in the 1984
case Reed v. Ross, the Court stated, “[w]hen a procedural default
bars litigation of a constitutional claim in state court, a state prisoner may not obtain federal habeas corpus relief absent a showing

38. 372 U.S. at 313.
39. 373 U.S. at 16-17; see also WERT, supra note 5, at 153.
40. KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 17, at 57-59.
41. 372 U.S. at 395-98.
42. Id. at 398-99; see also MEADOR, supra note 3, at 69-70.
43. KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 17, at 60.
44. See Kenneth Williams, Commentary, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act: What’s Wrong with It and How to Fix It, 33 CONN. L. REV. 919, 921-22 (2001).
45. 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976).
46. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977).
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of ‘cause and actual prejudice.’”47 Finally, in 1989, in Teague v. Lane,
the Court held that with limited exceptions, “new constitutional
rules of criminal procedure w[ould] not be applicable to those cases
which have become final before the new rules are announced.”48
Despite these substantial limitations, the public, in part due to the
high rate of federal court reversals of death sentences, clamored for
even more sweeping habeas corpus change, which subsequently led
to the adoption of the AEDPA.49
C. Adoption of the AEDPA
Signed into law on April 24, 1996, the AEDPA50 brought about
significant criminal procedural changes.51 Passed following the
Oklahoma City terrorist bombing, the bill had at least the partial
purpose of reducing domestic terrorism.52 In addition to this stated
goal, the legislation also brought about substantial habeas corpus
reform. As a threshold matter, the AEDPA empowers federal courts
to deny a habeas corpus application “on the merits,”53 which is a
substantial hurdle that applicants must constantly keep in mind.
The AEDPA also brought about several important procedural and
substantive restrictions outlined below.
One of the major additions by the AEDPA was the imposition of
a “1-year period of limitation” for writ of habeas corpus applications.54 Although this may seem rather short, this period actually
runs from the latest of the following: (1) the date on which the
judgment became final,55 (2) the date on which a state-imposed
impediment to filing a habeas application is removed,56 (3) the date
47. 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982)).
48. 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion).
49. See Williams, supra note 44, at 923.
50. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (relevant portions codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2266 (1996)).
51. See Andrea A. Kochan, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996:
Habeas Corpus Reform?, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 399, 399 (1997).
52. See AEDPA, 110 Stat. at 1214 (stating that the purpose of the Act is “to deter
terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective death penalty, and for other
purposes”).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).
54. Id. § 2244(d)(1).
55. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
56. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(B).
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on which a constitutional right applicable to a petitioner is recognized by the Supreme Court,57 or (4) the date on which due diligence
would have led to the discovery of the facts underlying the proposed
claim or claims.58
Another significant statutory element of the AEDPA is the
requirement that state prisoners exhaust all remedies available in
state court before their habeas corpus application can be granted.59
The AEDPA provides two exceptions to circumvent this requirement: (1) if the state corrective process is unavailable, or (2) the
process is ineffective due to the circumstances of the potential
petitioner’s situation.60 Furthermore, the exhaustion requirement
can only be expressly waived by a state through its counsel.61
In direct opposition to the expansion of federal habeas review by
the Supreme Court in the 1960s,62 the AEDPA restricted federal
courts’ ability to review state court judgments.63 A state court
judgment is presumed to be correct and can be rebutted only by
clear and convincing evidence presented by the habeas applicant.64
Additionally, if there was no factual basis developed by the habeas
applicant in state court, a federal court can only hold an evidentiary
hearing if: (1) there is a claim relying on a new rule of constitutional
law; (2) there were certain new facts that could not have been previously discovered; or (3) under the facts, no reasonable fact-finder
would have found the applicant guilty but for constitutional error.65
The AEDPA severely curtailed “second or successive” petitions.66
Under the Act, a federal court must dismiss claims already presented in a prior habeas application if they are brought in a “second
or successive” application.67 For a claim not brought in a previous
habeas petition, an applicant must show either that: (1) the claim
57. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(C).
58. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D).
59. Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
60. Id. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
61. Id. § 2254(b)(3).
62. See supra Part I.B.
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e).
64. Id. § 2254(e)(1).
65. Id. § 2254(e)(2)(A)-(B).
66. See id. § 2244(b)(1)-(3); see also Kochan, supra note 51, at 416 (“The Act’s new
standards impose more rigid requirements than under previous Supreme Court jurisprudence.”).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).
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relies on a new rule of law from the Supreme Court,68 or (2) the
factual basis for the claim was not previously discoverable through
due diligence and the applicant establishes through clear and
convincing evidence that he or she would not have been found guilty
but for constitutional error.69 An applicant must move in the appropriate court of appeals for authorization before filing a “second or
successive” habeas application in the district court, and this
application must also make “a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of th[e] subsection.”70 Although
the language regarding “second or successive” petitions is rather
strict, it is important to note that “second or successive” petitions
are not expressly defined by the Act or by § 2244.71 This lack of
definition has played an important role in subsequent court
decisions, as illustrated by Part II.
II. THE AEDPA, THE SUPREME COURT, AND RULE 59(E) AND 60(B)
MOTIONS
While the AEDPA made several significant changes to the statutory framework governing habeas petitions, the issue of what
constitutes a “second or successive” petition has become a key issue
considered by all levels of the federal court system.72 To illustrate
the significance of this pertinent issue, this Part highlights two
Supreme Court cases, Gonzalez v. Crosby73 and Banister v. Davis.74
These cases are significant to this Note’s discussion, as both involved analyses of motions brought after an initial habeas petition
was adjudicated on the merits.75 Although the Supreme Court came
68. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
69. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
70. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A), (C).
71. See Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 331-32 (2010) (“Congress did not define the
phrase ‘second or successive’.... We have described the phrase ... as a ‘term of art.’”).
72. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 8, at 215-18 (tracing the development of court approaches
to Rule 60(b) motions); Cory Wilson, Note, Rishor v. Ferguson: The Ninth Circuit Erred in
Holding that Rule 59(e) Motions Are Not Subject to the Restrictions of AEDPA When Those
Motions Do Not Present Entirely New Claims for Habeas Corpus Relief, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV.
641, 658-65 (2018) (noting the different court frameworks regarding Rule 59(e) motions in
habeas proceedings).
73. 545 U.S. 524 (2005).
74. 140 S. Ct. 1698 (2020).
75. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 526; Banister, 140 S. Ct. at 1702.

2022]

CHARACTERIZING HABEAS PETITIONS ON APPEAL

567

to opposite conclusions as to whether the motions at issue in both
cases were “second or successive,” the Court’s holdings were
ultimately in line with the restrictive approach set forth under the
AEDPA.
A. Gonzalez v. Crosby and Rule 60(b) Motions
In 2006, the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion was considered “second
or successive” if it was filed after the federal courts had denied
habeas corpus relief to the petitioner.76 When making a Rule 60(b)
motion, a party requests relief from a “final judgment, order, or
proceeding.”77 However, the Rule provides six instances in which
the requested relief can be granted: (1) mistake, (2) newly discovered evidence, (3) fraud or misconduct by an opposing party, (4) void
judgment, (5) judgment has been satisfied or is based on an earlier
judgment that has been reversed, or (6) any other reason justifying
relief.78
In Gonzalez, the petitioner had been arrested and convicted of
armed robbery before the passage of the AEDPA in 1996.79 After a
district court denied his habeas petition as time-barred under the
AEDPA’s statute of limitations, the petitioner filed a Rule 60(b)
motion, attempting to obtain relief from the final judgment.80 After
initially granting a certificate of appealability (COA) as required
under § 2244(b)(3)(A), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit81 subsequently quashed the COA and denied the petitioner’s
motion.82 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.83
In its decision, the Court turned its focus to whether the provisions of § 2244 limited the application of Rule 60(b) and the
76. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 526.
77. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
78. Id.
79. See 545 U.S. at 526-27.
80. Id. at 527.
81. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
82. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 528 (“The en banc majority determined that petitioner’s
motion—indeed, any postjudgment motion under Rule 60(b) save one alleging fraud on the
court under Rule 60(b)(3)—was in substance a second or successive habeas corpus petition.”
(citing Gonzalez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 366 F.3d 1253, 1278, 1281-82 (11th Cir. 2004) (en
banc)).
83. Id.

568

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:557

plaintiff’s motion under that rule.84 The crux of the Court’s holding
was twofold. First, the Court stated that Rule 60(b) motions that
seek to advance one or more claims qualify as “second or successive”
and are barred by § 2244.85 A motion can advance a claim in two
ways: (1) the motion “seeks to add a new ground for relief,” or (2) the
motion “attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on
the merits.”86 Second, a motion that only attacks a defect in the
integrity of the federal habeas proceeding does not advance a
“claim” and is thus not considered to be a “second or successive”
habeas petition.87 This aspect of the Court’s decision was found to be
directly applicable to the petitioner’s own motion, but the Eleventh
Circuit’s denial of the motion was nonetheless affirmed because
relief under Rule 60(b) requires extraordinary circumstances,
which were not found by the Court.88 Although the Supreme Court
did seem to draw a sharp distinction in Gonzalez for when Rule
60(b) motions would or would not be considered “second or successive,” the case did not address the situation in which a motion is put
forth while a habeas petition is on appeal.89
B. Banister v. Davis and Rule 59(e) Motions
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a litigant may file a
“motion to alter or amend a judgment,” as long as that motion is
brought within twenty-eight days from entry of that judgment.90 In
Banister v. Davis, the Supreme Court held Rule 59(e) motions do not
qualify as “second or successive” under the AEDPA and are instead
“part and parcel” of the initial habeas proceeding.91
The underlying case in Banister involved an automobile accident in which the petitioner, Banister, struck and killed a bicyclist
in Texas.92 The petitioner was charged with aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon, found guilty by a jury, and subsequently
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id. at 529-30.
Id. at 530-31.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 532-33.
See id. at 536.
See id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e).
140 S. Ct. 1698, 1702 (2020).
Id. at 1704.

2022]

CHARACTERIZING HABEAS PETITIONS ON APPEAL

569

sentenced to thirty years in prison.93 After fully exhausting his
state court appeals and collateral attacks, Banister brought a
habeas petition in federal court in which he primarily argued that
he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.94 After
the district court denied his application, Banister filed a Rule 59(e)
motion within the appropriate twenty-eight-day period.95 The district court stood by its decision, and Banister then appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.96 The Fifth
Circuit held that Banister’s Rule 59(e) motion constituted a “second
or successive” petition under the AEDPA and accordingly dismissed
his appeal.97
The Supreme Court based its opinion in Banister on both “historical habeas doctrine and practice” and the “AEDPA’s own
purposes.”98 The Court found that in almost all cases involving Rule
59(e) motions that predated the AEDPA, courts did not deem those
motions as “second or successive.”99 The Court then stated, “the
[AEDPA] did not redefine what qualifies as a successive petition,
much less place Rule 59(e) motions in that category.”100 Focusing on
the ability of the district courts to fix mistakes and the quick
turnaround requirement for filing, the Court asserted that Rule
59(e) motions were consistent with the AEDPA’s goal of streamlining habeas cases.101 Importantly, the Court distinguished Rule 59(e)
motions from Rule 60(b) motions, reasoning that Rule 60(b) motions
were too removed from the initial habeas judgment.102 Here again
the Supreme Court failed to address cases involving motions to
amend while the habeas petition was on appeal,103 leaving the door
open for circuit courts to formulate their own methods.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1705-06.
See id. at 1706-07.
Id. at 1707.
Id. at 1708.
See id. at 1710.
See id.
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III. CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES TO COLLATERAL REVIEW FILINGS
OF HABEAS PETITIONS
As a result of the Supreme Court’s inaction in this area, a circuit
split has developed over when collateral review ends for purposes of
subsequent motions and other filings. Several cases from the circuit
courts, namely the Second, Third, and Ninth, are outlined in this
Part to illustrate the present circuit split. Section A focuses on the
similar approaches of the Second and Third Circuits and their
allowance of motions to amend while the habeas petition is on
appeal in their courts.104 Section B examines the contrary approach
of the Ninth Circuit, which does not allow these motions to amend
following a district court’s adjudication on the merits.105
A. Second and Third Circuit Approach
In both the Second and Third Circuits, petitions filed during
appellate proceedings are not considered “second or successive” and
thus are allowable under the AEDPA.106
In Ching v. United States, then-Circuit Judge Sonia Sotomayor
wrote the opinion for the Second Circuit.107 Petitioner Ching pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, and the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction on appeal.108
Six years later, Ching filed a motion under § 2255 (as he was a federal prisoner), bringing claims of ineffective counsel and improper
104. See Ching v. United States, 298 F.3d 174, 175 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v.
Santarelli, 929 F.3d 95, 98 (3d Cir. 2019).
105. See Balbuena v. Sullivan, 980 F.3d 619, 636-38 (9th Cir. 2020); Beaty v. Schriro, 554
F.3d 780, 782-83 (9th Cir. 2009). The Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have also taken
similar approaches. See Moreland v. Robinson, 813 F.3d 315, 324 (6th Cir. 2016); Phillips v.
United States, 668 F.3d 433, 435 (7th Cir. 2012); Ochoa v. Sirmons, 485 F.3d 538, 540 (10th
Cir. 2007). However, Balbuena provides the most recent and best representative articulation
of the approach applied by this side of the circuit split, and as a result it warrants further
exploration in this Note.
106. See Ching, 298 F.3d at 175; Whab v. United States, 408 F.3d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 2005);
Santarelli, 929 F.3d at 98; see also Hamm, supra note 9 (discussing the Second Circuit’s
approach).
107. 298 F.3d at 175.
108. Id.
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calculation of his conduct for sentencing.109 The district court denied
his motion as untimely, and Ching appealed the decision to the
Second Circuit.110 Before a decision could be reached by the court,
however, Ching filed a § 2241 habeas petition challenging the
district court’s jurisdiction over his criminal case, which the district
court then found to be successive and thus barred.111 Following an
appeal of the district court’s denial, the Second Circuit stated:
The AEDPA does not define what constitutes a “second or
successive” § 2255 motion. Nonetheless, it is clear that for a
petition to be “second or successive” within the meaning of the
statute, it must at a minimum be filed subsequent to the
conclusion of “a proceeding that ‘counts’ as the first. A petition
that has reached final decision counts for this purpose.”112

The court then went on to articulate its understanding that a prisoner has one full opportunity to seek collateral review under the
AEDPA.113 The court also recognized the stringency of the restrictions the AEDPA placed on habeas petitions, further bolstering the
need for full adjudication.114 Thus, the court concluded Ching’s
second habeas filing should be treated as a motion to amend, which
falls under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, and not a “second or
successive” filing under § 2255.115 Although Rule 15 provides a
rather liberal standard,116 the Second Circuit provided the district
court with discretion in denying a subsequent habeas petition so as
to prevent abuse of the writ of habeas corpus.117
The Third Circuit also considered a federal prisoner’s habeas
petition under § 2255 in United States v. Santarelli.118 The petitioner, Santarelli, was convicted in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania of mail fraud, wire fraud,
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 176.
112. Id. at 177 (quoting Littlejohn v. Artuz, 271 F.3d 360, 363 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam)).
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 179-81.
116. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice
so requires.”); see also MARY KAY KANE, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 111 (8th ed. 2018).
117. Ching, 298 F.3d at 180.
118. 929 F.3d 95, 98 (3d Cir. 2019).
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and conspiracy to defraud the United States.119 Santarelli then
timely filed a habeas petition alleging, among other things, that her
counsel during the trial and appellate proceedings was ineffective
in 130 different ways.120 While her habeas motion was pending in
district court, Santarelli filed a motion to amend under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15(c) to add in allegations of sentencing violations.121 The district court denied both motions, and Santarelli
appealed to the Third Circuit.122
The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held
that “the allegations contained in Santarelli’s Motion to Amend
‘relate back’ to the date of her initial habeas petition pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) and that her Subsequent
Petition [was] not a ‘second or successive’ habeas petition within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2255(h).”123 The court acknowledged that the AEDPA does not define “second or successive,” and
it thus relied on its own interpretation.124 The court ultimately
stated that a petition is “second or successive” if it is filed after the
petitioner has expended his or her one full opportunity for collateral review, which the court determined to be after all appellate
remedies had been exhausted or expired.125 Acknowledging the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby, the court held that
the case did not apply as the Motion to File Subsequent Petition at
issue was not a Rule 60(b) motion.126 Instead, the court deemed the
motion to be a motion to amend the initial habeas petition, which
was then to be decided upon by the district court if the case were
remanded by the court of appeals.127 The court did recognize the

119. Id.
120. Id. at 98-99.
121. Id. at 99.
122. Id. at 99-100.
123. Id. at 98.
124. See id. at 103-05.
125. Id. at 104-05.
126. Id. at 105.
127. Id. (“If, as we hold here, a subsequent habeas petition is not a ‘second or successive’
petition when it is filed during the pendency of an appeal of the district court’s denial of the
petitioner’s initial habeas petition (the principal [sic] being that ‘[a] document filed pro se is
“to be liberally construed”’), that subsequent petition should be construed as a motion to
amend the initial habeas petition.” (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam))).
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AEDPA’s aversion to “piecemeal” litigation,128 but it notably concluded that the motion at issue was not a successive petition as the
petitioner had not yet expended her one full opportunity to seek
collateral review.129 This recognition of the AEDPA is important
because the court considered the potential restraints associated
with the Act but still deemed it necessary to allow the motion to
amend and provide the petitioner the opportunity to have all of her
reasonable claims adjudicated.130
B. Ninth Circuit Approach
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
considers motions to amend habeas petitions filed during appellate
proceedings to be “second or successive,” and thus barred by
AEDPA.131 In the recent decision Balbuena v. Sullivan, the court
considered two consolidated appeals by the petitioner, Balbuena,
which challenged both the district court’s denial of his habeas
petition and its denial of his Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the
judgment and amend his original petition to add a new claim.132
Balbuena’s state criminal case revolved around his involvement in
a gang-related shooting, and he was ultimately found guilty of firstdegree murder, attempted murder, and street terrorism.133
After exhausting his appeals in state court and timely filing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Balbuena primarily argued that
his confession while in police custody “violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause because his statements were
involuntary.”134 After the district court’s denial of his habeas petitions, a series of remands, denials, and appeals followed in the
district court and Ninth Circuit.135 Finally, Balbuena’s Rule 60(b)

128. Id. at 106.
129. Id. at 104-05 (citing Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 413 (3d Cir. 2011)).
130. See id.
131. Balbuena v. Sullivan, 980 F.3d 619, 636-38 (9th Cir. 2020); Beaty v. Schriro, 554 F.3d
780, 782-83 (9th Cir. 2009).
132. 980 F.3d at 624.
133. Id. at 627.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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motion to amend his habeas petition to add a new claim came before
the Ninth Circuit.136
In its decision, the court acknowledged established circuit precedent that these types of motions should be denied as successive
petitions under § 2244(b).137 The Ninth Circuit then addressed the
decisions in Ching v. United States and United States v. Santarelli,
but was ultimately unpersuaded by the respective reasonings of
those courts.138 The Ninth Circuit distinguished the two cases by
arguing that neither addressed Rule 60(b) motions or applied the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Gonzalez v. Crosby.139 Instead, the court
stated:
In Santarelli and Ching, after the appellate courts reversed and
remanded the denial of the petitioners’ initial habeas petitions,
the initial and second petitions were before the district courts
simultaneously. Therefore, the district courts could apply Rule
15 and consider the petitioners’ second petitions as motions to
amend the initial petitions.140

Additionally, the court pointed to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Gonzalez as preventing Rule 60(b) motions from being considered
anything but a “disguised habeas petition.”141 Using this reasoning,
Rule 60(b) motions would thus be subject to the stringent “second
and successive” requirements of § 2244(b).142 In addressing whether
the motion should be characterized as “second or successive,” the
Ninth Circuit chose to emphasize the nature—and not the timing—
of the petitioner’s motion, which it believed was in accordance with
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gonzalez.143 In doing so, the court’s
interpretation only viewed Balbuena’s Rule 60(b) motion as advancing a new claim and thus was “second or successive,” regardless
of the timing of its filing.144
136. Id. at 627-28. Balbuena sought to add a claim that his confession while in police
custody violated his Miranda rights. Id. at 628.
137. See id. at 636-37 (citing Beaty v. Schriro, 554 F.3d 780, 782-83 (9th Cir. 2009)).
138. Id. at 637-38.
139. Id. at 637.
140. Id. (internal citations omitted).
141. Id. at 639.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 639-40 (citing Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530-32 (2005)).
144. See id. at 640.
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Judge Fletcher, concurring in Balbuena, agreed with the court’s
decision and recognized that it was bound by its earlier ruling in
Beaty v. Schriro, but expressed his disagreement with the precedent
and advocated for Supreme Court intervention in opposition to the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling.145 He wrote, “If a district court denies a
habeas petition and the petitioner appeals, there is no final
adjudication until the appeal has been finally adjudicated.”146 Judge
Fletcher also believed that Gonzalez, while establishing that Rule
60(b) motions that seek to add a new claim are disguised habeas
petitions, did not answer whether such motions qualify as “second
or successive” under § 2244(b).147 Thus, Judge Fletcher argued that
the Second and Third Circuit approaches should be followed by the
Supreme Court in the event it decides to intervene to resolve the
circuit split.148
Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Balbuena sought a grant
of certiorari from the Supreme Court.149 However, the Supreme
Court denied this petition on June 14, 2021, so the circuit split over
this issue persists.150
IV. ENSURING FULL ADJUDICATION: THE NEED FOR BROAD
INTERPRETATION
To resolve the present circuit split, this Part advocates for the
characterization of a motion to amend while on appeal as still part
of the initial habeas petition as opposed to a “second or successive”
filing. Section A puts forth several arguments that support this
assertion and why the Supreme Court must intervene on this issue.
Section B proposes a potential solution for the circuit split in the
form of a test that should be applied by the Supreme Court in a case
involving motions to amend while on appeal, the central issue in
this Note.

145. See id. at 642 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 644.
147. Id. at 645.
148. Id.
149. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Balbuena v. Cates, 141 S. Ct. 2755 (2021) (mem.)
(No. 20-1207), 2021 WL 809352 at *2 (U.S. 2021).
150. See Balbuena v. Cates, 141 S. Ct. 2755 (No. 20-1207). No comment or explanation was
provided for the court’s decision. See id.
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A. Arguments for Allowing Motions to Amend Habeas Petitions
While Cases Are on Appeal
While the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in
Balbuena,151 that case was not the best representative of this issue.
The Ninth Circuit, despite denying Balbuena the ability to amend
his petition to add his Miranda violation claim to his original
habeas petition, still considered and denied the applicability of his
claims.152 Thus, a case involving a claim with more merit could be
the difference in the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari.
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Balbuena and the
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision not to grant certiorari, there
are several arguments that can be advanced to support allowing
motions to amend while on appeal in a circuit court. These arguments center on the litigants themselves and the effects that a more
restrictive approach has—and will continue to have—on these
individuals, who already face considerable opposition under the
AEDPA.
1. Protecting Litigants from Unfair Outcomes
Like with many circuit splits, affected parties in the habeas context can suffer ill effects based solely on the jurisdiction in which
they bring their claims.153 For prisoners who have already been
convicted and most likely are serving prison time, this negative
impact is particularly acute as they are extremely limited in the
federal courts available to them for habeas review.154 Thus, as the
law currently stands, a habeas petitioner in California will be
unable to successfully bring a motion to amend while his or her case
151. Id.
152. See Balbuena, 980 F.3d at 631-32.
153. See, e.g., Lauren Casale, Note, Back to the Future: Permitting Habeas Petitions Based
on Intervening Retroactive Case Law to Alter Convictions and Sentences, 87 FORDHAM L. REV.
1577, 1581-82 (2019) (using an example of two brothers imprisoned in different prisons for the
same crime who then found themselves on different sides of a circuit split); Ashley Alexander,
Online Contribution, One Strike and You’re Out: The Post-Hueso State of Habeas Corpus
Petitions Under the Savings Clause, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. ONLINE 84, 92, 96 (2020) (arguing
that the Sixth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of § 2255(e) leads to the reduction of habeas
rights and unnecessarily prolonged detention).
154. See Casale, supra note 153, at 1580-82.
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is on appeal,155 whereas a petitioner in New York or Pennsylvania
will have a much greater chance of having his or her motion granted
in an identical situation.156 This difference is not only unfair but also
provides an opportunity for the Supreme Court to intervene.157
The heightened stringency imposed by the adoption of the AEDPA
has also had a profound negative impact on pro se litigants.158 While
a great deal of concern for these pro se petitioners has been focused
on the filing deadline following a final judgment in state court,159
there should also be concern for differences in procedure that may
affect the one opportunity available for habeas review. Additionally,
pro se litigants, with limited access to legal help and resources,
already struggle to bring all claims that are available to them.160
Further restricting their ability to bring claims serves to essentially
tie both hands behind the pro se litigants’ backs.
Also, a standard of equity for pro se litigants can be found
throughout federal courts’ habeas decisions.161 Professor Eve
Brensike Primus states: “When a federal court believes that a state
prisoner has not had a full and fair opportunity to present his or her
claims and have them fairly considered, it is more likely to bypass
the procedural and substantive barriers to relief.”162 Applying this
reasoning, a court that uses the Ninth Circuit’s restrictive approach
in Balbuena may feel compelled to bypass that approach in the
155. See supra Part III.B.
156. See supra Part III.A.
157. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (stating that a compelling reason that may be considered by the
Supreme Court in the granting of certiorari is when “a United States court of appeals has
entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on
the same important matter”).
158. See Thomas C. O’Bryant, The Great Unobtainable Writ: Indigent Pro Se Litigation
After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 41 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV.
299, 307-09 (2006).
159. See id. at 328-31.
160. See id. at 324-28 (focusing on the difficulty posed by limited access to computers in
prison as it relates to researching potential claims).
161. See Eve Brensike Primus, Equitable Gateways: Toward Expanded Federal Habeas
Corpus Review of State-Court Criminal Convictions, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 304 (2019); see also
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (holding a document filed pro se must
be liberally construed); Allen v. Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Although the
evidence of incompetence may not have been artfully presented, the district court must
construe pro se habeas filings liberally.”). But see Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311
(2005) (“[W]e have never accepted pro se representation alone or procedural ignorance as an
excuse for prolonged inattention when a statute’s clear policy calls for promptness.”).
162. Primus, supra note 161, at 304.
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interest of providing an equitable adjudication of the applicant’s
case. Thus, the profile of a future habeas petitioner could and should
prove particularly persuasive in a case involving a motion to amend
while on appeal in the circuit court.
2. Compliance with Gonzalez v. Crosby
Although Gonzalez v. Crosby spent a considerable amount of time
discussing and summarily rejecting Rule 60(b) motions that “present[ ] a claim,”163 the Court did not place a complete bar on motions
to amend that may qualify as disguised habeas petitions.164 Notably,
the Court also did not address the timing of the filing.165 The Ninth
Circuit in Balbuena v. Sullivan interpreted this omission as
characterizing motions to amend that assert a claim as “second or
successive.”166 However, as pointed out in Judge Fletcher’s concurrence in Balbuena, this omission should not be treated as an
affirmative answer to the question of whether the motions should be
characterized as “second or successive.”167 So, although the Ninth
Circuit has seemingly placed a rather firm line on the issue, one can
satisfy the requirements of Gonzalez and still allow a motion to
amend while on appeal in the circuit court.
3. Consistency with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
In Banister v. Davis, the Supreme Court asserted, “[the AEDPA’s]
restrictions, like all statutes and rules pertaining to habeas, trump
any ‘inconsistent’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure otherwise applicable to habeas proceedings.”168 Although this may seem strict
and inflexible, the Court went on in the same opinion to hold that
Rule 59(e) motions, if timely filed, were not contrary to the AEDPA
and thus permissible.169 As a result, there appears to be at least
slight deference from the Supreme Court to certain federal rules for
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See 545 U.S. 524, 530 (2005).
See id.
See Balbuena v. Sullivan, 980 F.3d 619, 639-40 (9th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 640.
Id. at 645 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
140 S. Ct. 1698, 1704 (2020).
Id. at 1710-11.
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habeas petitions, which could provide an opening to motions to
amend under another rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) allows for amendments that
“relate[ ] back” to the date of the original pleading.170 Under the
Second and Third Circuit approaches, the motions to amend were
characterized as Rule 15 motions instead of Rule 60(b) motions, and
were subsequently allowed to proceed by the courts under this
characterization.171 Rule 15 motions have been treated favorably in
the Ninth Circuit as well,172 indicating that even courts with restrictive approaches may be open to motions to amend depending on how
they are framed in the court filing. With this in mind, petitioners
who make motions to amend while on appeal should attempt to
bring these under Rule 15 in order to bring attention to the
associated favorable treatment.
4. The Importance of “Full” and “Final” Adjudication
A key element in the decisions of the Second and Third Circuit to
allow the motions to amend at issue was the idea of full adjudication
of a habeas petitioner’s claims.173 Both courts asserted that full adjudication concluded when all appeals were completely resolved.174
This understanding makes sense, as a habeas petition on appeal is
incomplete while awaiting the decision of the respective court of
appeals or even the Supreme Court. It still requires a final say as to
the litigant’s case.
To determine what constitutes a “final” judgment, one can simply
look to the language of the AEDPA itself. For the one-year limitation period to begin running for the purpose of filing a habeas
petition, there are several dates that could qualify.175 One of these
is “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

170. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1).
171. See Ching v. United States, 298 F.3d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v.
Santarelli, 929 F.3d 95, 104-05 (3d Cir. 2019).
172. See Balbuena, 980 F.3d at 636 (discussing Goodrum v. Busby, 824 F.3d 1188, 1195
(9th Cir. 2016)).
173. See Ching, 298 F.3d at 177; Santarelli, 929 F.3d at 104-05.
174. See Ching, 298 F.3d at 177; Santarelli, 929 F.3d at 104-05.
175. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
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review.”176 The finality of the judgment has been the subject of
debate, particularly as it applies to filing a petition for certiorari for
the Supreme Court.177 What has not been debated, however, is the
inclusion of the appeal process in the determination of a final
judgment. Thus, district court habeas decisions, while on appeal in
circuit court, should not be classified as final for the same reasoning. This would then allow for a motion to amend to not be seen as
“second or successive,” as it is amending a petition that is still
pending in the federal court system.
5. Quelling Fears as to Judicial Efficiency
One of the AEDPA’s purposes, as stated by scholars and the
Supreme Court, was to act as a gatekeeper in preventing excessive
habeas petitions, expediting and streamlining the habeas process.178
However, allowing these motions to amend will not lead to further
complications or roadblocks to the habeas process because they
allow petitioners to truly exhaust all of their claims within in the
confines of the adjudication. Unlike the Rule 60(b) motion considered in Gonzalez v. Crosby, motions to amend while on appeal
could only be brought while the appeal was being considered, as
opposed to being brought long after the courts have decided on the
petition.179
Additionally, some scholars have argued that federal courts are
already burdened with extensive habeas cases.180 However, a study
analyzing habeas petition data found that amended petitions were
filed in 35.2 percent of capital cases and only 11.8 percent of noncapital cases,181 which are arguably low percentages considering the

176. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
177. See Benjamin R. Orye III, Note, The Failure of Words: Habeas Corpus Reform, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and When a Judgment of Conviction Becomes
Final for the Purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1), 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 441, 443 (2002).
178. See Wilson, supra note 72, at 666; Larry Yackle, Federal Habeas Corpus in a Nutshell,
28 HUM. RTS. 7, 8 (2001); Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698, 1708 (2020).
179. See 545 U.S. 524, 527 (2005).
180. See generally Marc D. Falkoff, The Hidden Costs of Habeas Delay, 83 U. COLO. L. REV.
339, 342-43 (2012) (utilizing district court data from 1996 to 2008).
181. See NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS,
FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 1, 34 (2007), https://
www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf [https://perma.cc/PKJ4-R65W].

2022]

CHARACTERIZING HABEAS PETITIONS ON APPEAL

581

thousands of habeas cases filed each year.182 The amendment of
petitions thus does not appear to be that widespread of an issue and
should not be a significant habeas corpus concern for courts.
Habeas petitioners are still very much encouraged to include all
possible claims with their original habeas petition so as to not have
to jump through the procedural hurdles associated with filing a
motion to amend while also being on appeal in a separate court.183
So, courts would likely not have to worry about the number of
petitions rising dramatically as a result of a potential Supreme
Court decision favorable to amending petitions while on appeal.
B. Resolving the Circuit Split: The Test That Should Be Applied
by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court must intervene on this issue. This Section
lays out the test that should be applied by the Court in order to best
take into account the concerns and arguments of habeas applicants,
the courts, and the legislature.184
First, the Court must determine when the motion to amend was
filed. For motions to amend while the action was pending in the
district court, courts are in relative agreement that these do not
qualify as “second or successive.”185 If this does not apply and the
motion was filed while on appeal in the circuit court, the analysis
will move on to the next step.
Second, the Court must apply an analysis according to its decision
in Gonzalez v. Crosby and parse out whether the motion to amend
makes a new “claim.”186 A finding of a new claim then leads to the
classification of the motion as a “disguised habeas petition” and
must be evaluated as “second or successive.”187 If a new claim is not
182. In 2006, over 18,000 habeas petitions were filed in federal district courts by state
prisoners seeking habeas relief. Id. at 9-10. In 2021, over 13,500 habeas petitions were filed.
Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary—December 2021: Table C-2, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 31,
2021), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-2/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2021/
12/31 [https://perma.cc/64CN-57DW]. Additionally, habeas petitions only make up a small
portion of total civil cases commenced in federal courts, which was 327,863 in 2021. See id.
183. See Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, 2 Fed. Habeas Corpus Prac. & Proc. 7th (MB)
§ 28.1 (Dec. 2021).
184. See supra Part IV.A.
185. See Balbuena v. Sullivan, 980 F.3d 619, 637 (9th Cir. 2020).
186. See 545 U.S. 524, 529-31 (2005).
187. Balbuena, 980 F.3d at 638; see also Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 529-31.

582

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:557

found by the reviewing court, then the motion may proceed forward
in the court’s analysis.
Next, the Court will look to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
under which the motion was brought. As mentioned in the previous
Section, Rule 15 motions to amend have garnered much more favorable treatment in federal court for habeas cases.188 Under Rule 15,
courts should look to whether the motion to amend “relates back” to
the date of the original proceeding and if it does, it should be
granted.189 Additionally, a motion brought under Rule 15 may avoid
the pitfalls of the Supreme Court’s precedent in Gonzalez v. Crosby,
which restricted motions to amend under Rule 60 to cases involving
extraordinary circumstances.190 A court dealing with a motion to
amend under Rule 15 would thus have supporting precedent and
would be less likely to face later reversal.
Finally, it may be helpful for the Court to look to the circumstances surrounding the habeas petitioner’s claims. Particularly,
more deference should be given to pro se petitioners. These individuals typically do not have the same resources as petitioners represented by counsel and as a result are usually provided more
favorable treatment by courts when it comes to procedural issues.191
Although this element is not dispositive and will vary with each
particular case, keeping the particular circumstances of a petitioner
in mind will allow courts to strive for more equitable adjudications
of habeas petitions, especially considering that those courts may
represent the last shot for applicants to have their cases reviewed.
All of the above considerations together will allow the Supreme
Court to properly assess whether a motion to amend while a habeas
petition is on appeal should be allowed.
CONCLUSION
Since the imposition of the express restrictions of the AEDPA,192
prisoners have sought many different avenues in order to have an

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See supra Part IV.A.3.
See supra Part IV.A.3.
545 U.S. at 538.
See supra Part IV.A.1.
See supra Part I.C.
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opportunity to bring all of their available habeas claims.193 This
Note has addressed one of those avenues in depth, motions to
amend while the habeas petition is on appeal in a circuit court of
appeals, and has argued that these motions should be allowed
because the judgment of the case is not fully final.194 As a habeas
petitioner really only has one true opportunity to litigate his or her
claims in federal court under the AEDPA regime, this distinction
could be critical to the success of his or her claims, especially when
facing an initial denial and appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
should intervene on this issue and utilize the approaches of the
Second and Third Circuits195 as well as the test outlined above.196
Although certiorari was recently denied in Balbuena,197 this issue is
clearly relevant to the current habeas climate and will likely come
up again for consideration in the near future. Hopefully, we will
soon see a favorable court decision or a change in law which will
alleviate some of the significant burdens bearing down on habeas
petitioners and allow them to have at least a fair and full bite at the
habeas corpus apple.
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193. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. See generally Peter Hack, The Roads Less
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